"The United Wa State Army is the largest and most powerful drug trafficking organization in Southeast Asia and is a major producer and exporter of synthetic drugs, including methamphetamine," said OFAC Deputy Director Barbara C. Hammerle. "Today OFAC is targeting the Wa's lieutenants and the financial holdings of this massive drug trafficking organization. We call on other nations to do the same." 

On June 1, 2000, the President identified Wei Hsueh Kang as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker under the Kingpin Act. Wei is a senior commander of the UWSA, which the President subsequently identified as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker on May 29, 2003. In January 2005, federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York unsealed a criminal indictment charging Wei, along with his brothers Wei Hsueh Lung and Wei Hsueh Ying, who are designated today, for narcotics trafficking. The U.S. Department of State is offering a reward of up to $2,000,000 for information leading to Wei Hsueh Kang's capture.

Other key individuals designated by OFAC are Pao Yu Hsiang, Ho Chun Ting and Shih Kuo Neng. Pao Yu Hsiang, indicted in 2005 with Wei Hsueh Kang, is the Commander-in-Chief of the UWSA. In May 2005, prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York charged Ho Chun Ting and Shih Kuo Neng, among others, with money laundering and narcotics trafficking.  In October 2007, Hong Kong authorities arrested Ho Chun Ting, a partner of Wei Hsueh Kang, but Hong Kong later released him for unknown reasons. Shih Kuo Neng is the manager of the Hong Pang conglomerate of companies, many of which are also designated today. 

Wei Hsueh Kang
AKAs: Prasit Chivinnitipanya
Date of Birth: 5/29/52
Place of Birth: China
Height: 5'6"
Weight: 125 lbs
Eyes: Brown
Hair: Black
Race: Asian
Nationality: Chinese

For a complete layout of the United Wa State Army download the following document United Wa State Army Organization.

This action is part of ongoing efforts under the Kingpin Act to apply financial measures against significant foreign narcotics traffickers worldwide.  Internationally, 419 businesses and individuals associated with 75 drug kingpins have been designated by OFAC pursuant to the Kingpin Act since June 2000.

The designation action freezes any assets the 43 designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibits U.S. persons from conducting transactions or dealings in the property interests of the designated individuals and entities. Penalties for violations of the Kingpin Act range from civil penalties of up to $1,075,000 per violation to more severe criminal penalties. Criminal penalties for corporate officers may include up to 30 years in prison and fines up to $5,000,000. Criminal fines for corporations may reach $10,000,000. Other individuals face up to 10 years in prison, and fines pursuant to Title 18 of the United States Code, for criminal violations of the Kingpin Act.

A very refreshing story about a magazine called "Muslim Girl" that promotes a message of cultural integration without endangering religious values. Too many times the only stories we hear about Islam is about the extremists and terrorists who are trying to steal away the meaning of Islam. Check out the video profile below:

During his election bid, President Barack Obama said that he would be willing to meet with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. this has certainly sparked interest from leaders in the Middle East. It now seems that Hamas has been encouraged by the President's stance enough to express a desire to talk with the President-elect.  "We are ready to hold a serious duologue with the new United States president," de facto Gaza prime minister and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh said Thursday.

Keep in mind that President Obama has made comments that he would not meet with outlawed terrorist organizations. In the world of politics it is always interesting to see the difference between a politician's promise, talk and pen. While Obama has made stern statements about Hamas, the Democrats did meet with Hamas leaders, remember the summer trip by former President Carter?

This is a definite turn-around for the terrorist organization that made the following comments during the Presidential race: 

Hamas leader Sami Abu Zuhri chastised both the Democratic and Republic candidates. "Hamas does not differentiate between the two presidential candidates, Obama and McCain, because their policies regarding the Arab-Israel conflict are the same and are hostile to us. Therefore we… have no preference and are not wishing for either of them to win," he said.

Conclusion:
President-elect Barack Obama faces many international challenges as he assembles his staff for the transition. While the President may not meet directly with Hamas it will be interesting to see if he sends any representatives to deal with the terrorist group that is a legitimate, democratically elected government representative. Another aspect of this development is why did the terrorist organization change its tune, since Obama says that Hamas has to give up violence and recognize Israel? What is the endgame that Hamas is playing? Is this another ploy to continue to gain legitimacy for this terrorist organization? Will it try to gain funds to continue its operations? Only time will tell, stay posted.

On October 16, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which has members representing 32 jurisdictions and is the world's premier standard-setting body for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT), warned for the fourth time about the risks posed to the international financial system by continuing deficiencies in Iran's AML/CFT regime. The FATF called for all countries to strengthen preventive measures to protect their financial systems from this risk.  Additionally, the UN Security Council called upon all states in March 2008 to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all Iranian banks.

Consistent with these multilateral calls for action, the Treasury Department is revoking the "U-turn" general license today to protect U.S. financial institutions individually, and the U.S. financial system as a whole, from the significant terrorist financing and proliferation risks posed by Iran.  This regulatory action will close the last general entry point for Iran to the U.S. financial system.

Iran's access to the international financial system enables the Iranian regime to facilitate its support for terrorism and proliferation. The Iranian regime disguises its involvement in these illicit activities through the use of a wide array of deceptive techniques, specifically designed to avoid suspicion and evade detection by responsible financial institutions and companies. Iran also is finding ways to adapt to existing sanctions, including by turning to non-designated Iranian banks to handle illicit transactions. 

The Treasury Department is taking a range of measures to counter these deceptive activities. The Treasury Department encourages all jurisdictions to adopt robust preventive measures consistent with the FATF warnings and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). 

Iran Misuses the International Financial System to Support Terrorism

Iran is the world's most active state sponsor of terror. The support provided by the regime to terrorist groups includes financing that is routed through the international financial system, especially through Iranian state-owned banks.          

• Iran's Support to Terror.  The Department of State designated Iran as a state sponsor of international terrorism in 1984, and Iran remains the most active of the listed state sponsors of terrorism, routinely providing substantial resources and guidance to multiple terrorist organizations.  For example, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) maintain representative offices in Tehran to help coordinate Iranian financing and training of these groups.

• Iran's IRGC and IRGC-Qods Force Support Terrorist Groups.  Elements of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have been directly involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts throughout the world, including in the Middle East, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America.  The IRGC-Qods Force, which has been designated under Executive Order 13224 for providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist groups, is the Iranian regime's primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist and militant groups abroad.  Qods Force-supported groups include: Lebanese Hizballah; Palestinian terrorists; certain Iraqi Shi'a militant groups; and Islamic militants in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The Qods Force is especially active in the Levant, providing Lebanese Hizballah with funding, weapons and training. It has a long history of supporting Hizballah's military, paramilitary and terrorist activities, and provides Hizballah with more than $100 to $200 million in funding each year. The Qods Force continues to provide the Taliban in Afghanistan with limited weapons, funding, logistics and training in support of anti-U.S. and anti-coalition activities.

• Iran Uses its Banks to Finance Terrorism.  In a number of cases, Iran has used its state-owned banks to channel funds to terrorist organizations.  Between 2001 and 2006, Bank Saderat transferred $50 million from the Central Bank of Iran through Bank Saderat's subsidiary in London to its branch in Beirut for the benefit of Hizballah fronts that support acts of violence. Hizballah also used Bank Saderat to send funds to other terrorist organizations, including Hamas, which itself had substantial assets deposited in Bank Saderat as of early 2005.  The Treasury Department designated Bank Saderat under E.O. 13224 for providing financial services to Hizballah, Hamas and PIJ. Australia has also designated Bank Saderat. Iran's Bank Melli, which has been designated by the United States under E.O. 13382 for proliferation-related activities, was used to transfer at least $100 million to the IRGC-Qods Force between 2002 and 2006.       

• Iran Lacks a Counter-Terrorist Financing Legal Regime.  In addition to its regime-directed support to terrorist organizations, Iran continues to lack a legal framework to counter the risk of terrorist financing and has not indicated a willingness to address this deficiency.  The FATF's October statement on Iran notes that, while Iran has taken some steps towards implementing an anti-money laundering regime, there is a lack of even such a minimal "corresponding effort" by Iran in the area of counter-terrorist financing.            

Iran Misuses the International Financial System to Facilitate Proliferation

• Iran Continues to Pursue Nuclear Capabilities and Develop Ballistic Missiles.  In addition to its active support to terrorist and militant activities, Iran continues to defy the international community by pursuing nuclear capabilities and developing ballistic missiles in violation of five UNSCRs. Iran's failure to comply with these various resolutions has resulted in the UN Security Council's imposing sanctions against Iran. These have included specific provisions aimed at preventing Iran from abusing banks and the international financial system to pursue nuclear capabilities and develop ballistic missiles. 

• Iran Uses its Banks to Finance its Nuclear and Missile Programs. Multiple Iranian financial institutions have been implicated in facilitating Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. 

➢ Bank Sepah.  Iran's state-owned Bank Sepah has been designated in the United States under E.O. 13382 and by the UN Security Council under UNSCR 1747. Bank Sepah has provided direct and extensive financial services, such as arranging financing and processing dozens of multi-million dollar transactions, for the Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG), two Iranian missile firms designated by the UN Security Council in UNSCR 1737 and identified by President Bush in the Annex to E.O. 13382 for their direct roles in advancing Iran's ballistic missile programs. Bank Sepah also has provided financial services to SHIG's and SBIG's parent entity, Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which also was identified by President Bush in the Annex to E.O. 13382 for its role in overseeing all of Iran's missile industries.

➢ Bank Melli.  Iran's largest state-owned bank, Bank Melli, has facilitated numerous purchases of sensitive materials for Iran's nuclear and missile programs on behalf of UN-designated entities. In doing so, Bank Melli has provided a range of financial services to known proliferators, including letters of credit and the maintenance of accounts. The United States, the European Union, and Australia have designated Bank Melli.  

➢ Bank Mellat.  Iran's state-owned Bank Mellat has provided banking services in support of Iran's nuclear entities, namely the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and Novin Energy Company.  Bank Mellat, which was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2007, has serviced and maintained AEOI accounts, mainly through AEOI's financial conduit, Novin Energy. Bank Mellat has facilitated the movement of millions of dollars for Iran's nuclear program since at least 2003.

➢ Export Development Bank of Iran.  On October 22, 2008, the Treasury Department designated the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) under E.O. 13382 for providing or attempting to provide financial services to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which had been designated by both the European Union and the United States for its involvement in Iranian proliferation activities. Some MODAFL scientists and officials have also been designated by the UN. The EDBI provides financial services to multiple MODAFL-subordinate entities that permit these entities to advance Iran's WMD programs.  Furthermore, the EDBI has facilitated the ongoing procurement activities of various front companies associated with MODAFL-subordinate entities. In addition, since Bank Sepah's designation by the United States and the UN Security Council, the EDBI has served as one of the leading intermediaries handling Bank Sepah's financing, including WMD-related payments. The EDBI has also facilitated financing for other proliferation-related entities sanctioned under U.S. and UN authorities.

• International Focus on Proliferation Risks Associated with Iranian Financial Institutions.  The role that Iranian financial institutions play in Iranian proliferation activities is underscored by UNSCR 1803, which was adopted in March 2008 and calls upon states to exercise vigilance over the activities of their financial institutions with all Iranian banks. The FATF issued guidance in October 2008 to assist countries in implementing this provision. That guidance recommends that jurisdictions encourage their financial institutions to take strong preventive measures for the mitigation of risks posed by Iranian banks, including refusing to process transactions involving Iranian banks when full information regarding the parties to the transaction is unavailable. The FATF guidance also recommends that jurisdictions encourage their financial institutions to reassess, and if necessary, terminate correspondent relationships with Iranian banks, and take steps to satisfy themselves that their correspondent relationships with non-Iranian financial institutions are not used to circumvent the risk-mitigation practices in place for Iranian banks.

Iran Uses Deceptive Financial Practices to Evade Sanctions

• Iranian Commercial Banks.  It has been a standard practice for Iranian financial institutions to conceal their identity to evade detection when conducting transactions. For example, Bank Sepah has requested that its name be removed from transactions in order to make it more difficult for intermediary financial institutions to determine the true parties to a transaction. Following the designation of Bank Sepah under UNSCR 1747, Bank Melli took precautions not to identify Bank Sepah in transactions. Bank Melli also has employed similar deceptive practices to obscure its involvement from the international banking system when handling financial transactions on behalf of the IRGC. In addition, when Iranian assets were targeted in Europe, branches of Iranian state-owned banks in Europe took steps to disguise ownership of assets on their books in order to protect assets from future actions.        

• Central Bank of Iran.  The Central Bank of Iran (CBI), the sole Iranian entity that regulates all Iranian banks, has not only engaged in deceptive practices itself – such as asking for its name to be removed from transactions – but has also encouraged such practices among Iran's state-owned banks. For example, prior to EU and UN sanctions, the CBI attempted to help Banks Sepah and Melli protect their assets from being frozen. Later, the CBI instructed non-sanctioned Iranian state-owned banks to issue payment instructions on behalf of Sepah in order to circumvent sanctions. In the case of Bank Melli, the CBI provided substantive assistance to minimize the impact of sanctions. In fact, between January and March 2008, the CBI handled tens of millions of dollars in transactions to and from the accounts of U.S.- and UN-designated banks held at the CBI.

• Use of Front Companies and Misuse of Bank Accounts.  Iran hides behind front companies and intermediaries to engage in ostensibly legitimate financial and commercial transactions that are actually related to its nuclear or missile programs. Iranian entities form front companies outside of Iran for the sole purpose of exporting dual-use items to Iran that can be used in these programs. These front companies enable the regime to obtain materials that the country of origin would typically prohibit from being exported to Iran. Iran also has a history of using accounts set up for one purpose to facilitate activities with designated entities.  

• Use of Money Service Business Accounts.  Iran also has exploited its relationship with certain foreign money service businesses, capitalizing on a business model where the absence of an ongoing account relationship may mean that less information is collected on certain transactions. 

Effect of the Revocation of U-Turn License

OFAC has revoked the authorization of "U-turn" transfers for the direct or indirect benefit of Iran, through an amendment of the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 CFR part 560, to narrow the scope of existing § 560.516. This action affects the "U-turn" class of funds transfers, which are so named because, while they are conducted on behalf of Iranian account holders and banks or in connection with Iran-related transactions, they only pass through the U.S. financial system on their way from one offshore non-Iranian financial institution to another.

As a result of the action, U.S. depository institutions are no longer allowed to process "U-turn" transfers to or from Iran, or for the direct or indirect benefit of persons in Iran or the Government of Iran.  The prohibition on U-turns applies not only to state-owned Iranian banks and the Central Bank of Iran, but also to privately-owned Iranian banks, Iranian companies, and the settlement of third-country trade transactions that involve Iran. 

Allowable Transactions

This action will not affect funds transfers by U.S. depository institutions, through intermediary third-country banks, to or from Iran or for the direct or indirect benefit of the Government of Iran or a person in Iran arising from several types of underlying transactions including:

• A non-commercial remittance to or from Iran (e.g., a family remittance not related to a family-owned enterprise);
• The exportation to Iran or importation from Iran of information and informational materials;
• A travel-related remittance;
• Payment for the shipment of a donation of articles to relieve human suffering; or
• An underlying transaction authorized by OFAC through a specific or general license. Allowable funds transfers would include, for example, payments arising from over-flights of Iranian airspace, legal services, intellectual property protection, and authorized sales of agricultural products, medicine, and medical devices to Iran pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act. 

The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) pursuant to Executive Order 13382 for providing or attempting to provide financial services to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

"In response to international sanctions and the refusal of many responsible banks to do business with Iranian banks, Iran has adopted a strategy of using less prominent institutions, such as the Export Development Bank of Iran, to handle its illicit transactions." said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey. "Today's action exposes EDBI's role in helping Iran violate UN sanctions so that financial institutions around the world can take appropriate steps to protect themselves."

Established in 1991, the EDBI is an Iranian state-owned financial institution whose primary purpose is to serve Iran's import and export communities. In addition, the EDBI operates as the Iranian representative for the Islamic Development Bank, a multinational institution that cultivates economic and social improvements in member nations, in accordance with Islamic law. 

However, the EDBI provides financial services to multiple MODAFL-subordinate entities that permit these entities to advance Iran's WMD programs.  Furthermore, the EDBI has facilitated the ongoing procurement activities of various front companies associated with MODAFL-subordinate entities.

Since the United States and United Nations designated Bank Sepah in early 2007, the EDBI has served as one of the leading intermediaries handling Bank Sepah's financing, including WMD-related payments.  In addition to handling business for Bank Sepah, the EDBI has facilitated financing for other proliferation-related entities sanctioned under U.S. and UN authorities.

Also designated are three additional entities which were determined to be owned or controlled by or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the EDBI. These entities are: the EDBI Stock Brokerage Company and the EDBI Exchange Company, both located in Iran, and Banco Internacional de Desarollo, C.A., a financial institution located in Venezuela.

These actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order 13382, an authority aimed at freezing the assets of proliferators of WMDs and their supporters, and at isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems. Designations under E.O. 13382 are implemented by Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, and they prohibit all transactions between the designees and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction.

Background on Entities Previously Designated Under E.O. 13382
In October 2007, the U.S. Department of State designated MODAFL pursuant to E.O. 13382.  MODAFL controls the Defense Industries Organization, an entity identified in the Annex to UNSCR 1737 and designated by the United States pursuant to E.O. 13382 on March 30, 2007.

MODAFL has ultimate authority over the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), an umbrella group that controls Iran's ballistic missile research, development and production activities and organizations, including the Shahid Hemmat Industrial group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG). AIO, SHIG and SBIG were named in the Annex to E.O. 13382; SHIG and SBIG were also listed in the Annex to UNSCR 1737. MODAFL has publicly stated that one of its major products is the manufacture of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile.

The Treasury Department designated Bank Sepah under E.O. 13382 in January 2007 for providing financial support and services to Iran's AIO, SHIG and SBIG.  Since at least 2000, Bank Sepah has provided a variety of critical financial services to Iran's missile industry, arranging financing and processing dozens of multimillion dollar transactions for AIO and its subordinates, including SBIG and SHIG.

Identifying Information

EXPORT DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN
AKAs: EDBI; Bank Toseh Saderat Iran; Bank Towseeh Saderat Iran
Addresses: Tose'e Tower, Corner of 15 St., Ahmad Qasir Ave., Argentine Square, Tehran, Iran; No. 129, 21's Khaled Eslamboli, No. 1 Building, Tehran, Iran; Export Development Building, Next to the 15 Alley, Bokharest Street, Argentina Square, Tehran, Iran
C.R. No.: 86936 (Iran)
All branches worldwide

EDBI STOCK BROKERAGE COMPANY
Address: Tehran, Iran

EDBI EXCHANGE COMPANY
Address: Tehran, Iran

BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE DESAROLLO, C.A.
Address: Urb. El Rosal, Avenida Francisco de Miranda, Edificio Dozsa, Piso 8, Caracas, Venezuela, C.P. 1060
Tax Identification: RIF No. J294640109 (Venezuela) 
SWIFT/BIC No: IDUNVECA

Note: Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, C.A. is a separate and distinct entity from Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, known in English as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Banco Desarrollo Economico y Social De Venezuela (BANDES), an entity owned by the Government of Venezuela.

A recognized non partisan organization that researches the media published a report about the way the press has covered the presidential candidates. The results of this report will no doubt surprise some people.

At one time in our country, the media's job was to report the news without any bias or opinion. We have moved away from these tenets as the age of activism now infects all aspects of the media. Reporters are no longer content to give us the news, they now have to give us their opinion of the news. The media now decides which facts to give the public and coincidentally, these are the facts that support their world view and opinion.  

As those in the media have portrayed, this presidential election is historic in nature. Some of the candidates have made claims of media bias while the media denies these charges. The Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism is a research organization that specializes in using empirical methods to evaluate and study the performance of the press.

Here are highlights from three of the media areas (Cable News, Network News and Newspapers):

• MSNBC stood out for having less negative coverage of Obama than the press generally (14% of stories vs. 29% in the press overall) and for having more negative stories about McCain (73% of its coverage vs. 57% in the press overall).
• On Fox News, in contrast, coverage of Obama was more negative than the norm (40% of stories vs. 29% overall) and less positive (25% of stories vs. 36% generally). For McCain, the news channel was somewhat more positive (22% vs. 14% in the press overall) and substantially less negative (40% vs. 57% in the press overall). Yet even here, his negative stories outweighed positive ones by almost 2 to 1.
• CNN fell distinctly in the middle of the three cable channels when it came to tone. In general, the tone of its coverage was closer than any other cable news channel to the press overall, though also somewhat more negative than the media overall.
• The distinct tone of MSNBC—more positive toward Democrats and more negative toward Republicans—was not reflected in the coverage of its broadcast sibling, NBC News. Even though it has correspondents appear on their cable shows and even anchor some programs on there, the broadcast channel showed no such ideological tilt. Indeed, NBC’s coverage of Palin was the most positive of any TV organization studied, including Fox News.
• The same was true for Sarah Palin. She received generally more negative coverage from morning network programs than evening newscasts. In the morning, 39% of Palin stories studied were negative, compared with 30% in the evening. Meanwhile, mornings were less likely to be neutral toward her (30% compared with 47% at night). The only break from this pattern was that morning shows were also more likely to run positive stories about Palin (32% in the morning vs. 23% at night). In all this, the morning shows resembled the media overall (28% positive, 39% negative, 33% neutral).
• At night, the newscasts of the three traditional broadcast networks stood out for being more neutral—and also less negative—than most other news outlets. The morning shows of the networks, by contrast, more closely resembled the media generally in tone. That might surprise some who imagined those morning programs were somehow easier on political figures. Overall, 44% of the morning show stories were clearly negative, compared with 34% on the nightly news and 42% in the press overall.
• Indeed, of all the media sectors studied, John McCain received the most negative coverage in print. In all, 69% of the newspaper stories studied about McCain were clearly negative, while only 6% were positive, a ratio of about 11-to-1. (The press overall was 57% to 14%, a ratio of closer to 4-to-1.)

• Fully 76% of the stories where McCain was a significant presence were focused on the horserace aspect of the campaign, and of those, only 5% were positive while 73% were negative. Similarly, Obama fared better in the newspaper horserace stories than he did in newspaper stories overall. More than half of the horse race stories (53%) about Obama were positive, which was higher than the 45% of positive coverage he received in all newspaper stories and the 36% positive coverage he received in all media.